(In)visibility and Free Will

Like LAJ, I was struck by Hugh St. Victor’s focus on studying the visible world as a means to developing a stronger sense of admiration for God. This philosophical fixation on the visible world is prevalent throughout the Medieval period and extends through the Early Renaissance. For example, Marsilio Ficino, who was an Early Renaissance and Humanist philosopher, follows along with Hugh’s interest in the visible world. In his, “A Picture of a Beautiful Body and a Beautiful Mind,” Ficino claims that “the vision” of Virtue “itself will persuade more quickly than can be conceived” (Ficino, 4). Within his interest in viewing Virtue, Ficino argues that observing beauty is the same as witnessing Virtue, and that it is important for individuals to rely on their senses in engaging with the visible world than it is to read lengthy descriptions of morality, religion, and Virtue. For Ficino, it is possible to see a beautiful human being and recognize them as being moral and virtuous due to their God-given beauty. In this way, Ficino’s argument follows Hugh’s understanding that mankind should view evidence of God’s miracles and Creation, particularly in the beauty of man’s image being a physical representation of God’s miracles. Even though it may seem like an odd choice to even include Ficino’s belief on the role of the senses in interacting with beauty and religion, I think it helps show context for Hugh’s understanding and the lasting effects of this reliance on empiricism and the senses.

Returning back to Hugh’s argument, he suggests that we somehow develop a better understanding of God and can become closer to Him when we recognize mankind’s physical appearance as a miracle of God. Advancing on the quote that Professor Fulton Brown and LAJ brought up in regards to Hugh "For, since this lower life is the image of the higher life, it was fitting that in those things which were made for this life proof be set before man of those things which look to the higher life" (Hugh, 100). Hugh seems interested in claiming that the “lower life” is a direct representation or mirroring of the “higher life” of heaven. By this logic, Hugh asserts that observing and understanding the images and beauties on earth allow for a better understanding of the things in heaven. In this way, it seems that he is willing to contend that it is not possible to directly witness these divine entities, but instead, that an understanding of the divine comes from understanding the mortal/tangible.

As part of Hugh’s discussion of the visible serving as evidence for the invisible, he emphasizes that these visible proofs (mankind, earth, animals, beauty, etc.) are all examples of God’s creations. Thus, what we see on earth is meant to be proof of God since He is attributed to creating all of the mortal and divine beauties of the universe. Hugh’s claims are closely related to St. Augustine’s The Literal Meaning of Genesis. In his book, St. Augustine says, “Thus all of creation, whether intellectual or corporeal- or, as we put it more briefly in the words of the divine scriptures, whether invisible or visible- has been made by God, not out of the nature of God, but out of nothing” (Augustine, 146). Augustine, like Hugh, is interested in these seemingly contrasting notions of the visible and invisible and their relationship to God’s creation of the universe. Rather than focusing on these distinctions, both Augustine and Hugh suggest that it is more important to keep in mind that God created the visible and invisible worlds out of nothing, and that what cannot be seen does not have to be in contention with what is visible. Hugh seems to build off of Augustine’s explanation of God’s creation in his argument that the visible actually helps enlighten mankind in understanding what mortals cannot physically see.

An additional layer of Hugh’s argument lies in his discussion of God’s justice and mankind’s free will. He says that anything that “moves according to God” is “justice” and that anything that “moves without God or contrary to God” can be considered as an “injustice” (Hugh, 96). In this way, Hugh’s notion of mankind’s free will suggests that our “free will” is rather conditional and limited. If individuals use their free will to follow along with what God deems “just,” then they are following a path of justice. In comparison, if anyone asserts their free will to do anything contradictory to God, then they are unjust (it kind of feels like free will isn’t so free, but instead is rooted in following God’s idea of justice…or else). Hugh’s understanding of free will seems to also follow with St. Augustine’s description of sin and its relationship to free will. Augustine writes that, “Sin is nothing but the evil assent of free will, when we incline to those things which justice forbids and from which we are free to abstain. Sin does not lie in the things themselves, but in their illegitimate use” (Augustine, 146). Augustine and Hugh both focus on the fact that “injustices,” or sins, are actually just poor uses of free will. In accordance with both of their interpretations of justice, it seems like free will is intended to be used for the purposes of worshiping and following God, but that straying from this path results in “sin.” In this way, mankind is intended to engage with the material world around them in a way that brings them closer to God (i.e. viewing humans and God’s creations as His miracles and not disobeying God by misusing free will).

To follow suit of LAJ and help put everyone in a better mood for the weekend, please enjoy one of God's beautiful creations: 

(This is my girlfriend's dog, Honey, and if she doesn't brighten your day then nothing will)

-AC