Carthusian monks debating during weekly recreation.
Philip Gröning, Into Great Silence, DVD
(Zeitgeist Films, 2007).
|
In the 2005 documentary, Into
Great Silence, a group of
Carthusian monks enjoy a debate during their weekly recreation. They’re
discussing what some brothers argue is a trivial ritual: on their way to meals,
they wash their hands with a few perfunctory drops of water that fall sparsely
from a spigot. Certainly, there’s not enough water there to really clean
anything, so some of the brothers think that the community would be better off
without this useless ritual. But then one of the older monks steps in and says,
“The symbols are not to be questioned; we are.”[1]
While this statement could be read in an authoritarian way (“shut
up, believe, and behave”), it also suggests that as much as we like to
interrogate rituals for their meanings, they also interrogate our own
subjectivity, asking us questions about the ways our perceptions and beliefs
interact with the divine.
Put another way, rituals aren’t just there for us to unlock
their significance through a decoding interpretation: the ritual changes the
very subjectivity that would like to forward those interpretations. In what
follows, I’d like to turn to Hugh of St. Victor and Guido of Monte Rochen in
order to discover the ways that they conceive of the Mass as a dialogic space, both
an object for interpretation and, in its consecrated host, as a subject who
instructs.
The mass as an object for our decoding interpretation fits
well with certain approaches to religion in modernity—perhaps even across confessional
boundaries. Thus, a liturgically conservative Catholic like Martin Mosebach mourns
the loss of symbolic action in the Novus Ordo mass because he feels that
essential meanings have been lost through the disuse of liturgical gesture; his
book interprets the lost gestures—the joining of the priest’s thumb and index
finger after the consecration, the bishop’s use of gloves—in order to show how
they are theologically necessary and not needlessly cryptic. He interprets the
symbol so that its meaning becomes evident.[2]
From an academic perspective, we might point to the anthropologist
of religion Clifford Geertz as exemplary in his approach to the symbol; for him the symbol is “any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle
for a conception—the conception is the symbol’s meaning.”[3]
Geertz’s approach to the symbol places the act of interpretation front and
center: it is precisely interpretation that allows us to peer into the symbol
and divine its “meaning.”
We see both Hugh and Guido approaching the mass in a similar
way: their interpretative skills show that every gesture is, in fact, saturated
with divine intent. To take just one example from Guido, he writes that, after
the fraction of the consecrated host into three portions, “the priest puts one
part of the host into the chalice, and this signifies…those who are in
paradise.”[4]
Hugh also devotes his interpretative energies to explaining
the fraction. He argues that one of the fragments “is placed in the chalice
signifying those who still live in suffering until they themselves go out of
this life…”[5]
I choose these two examples from Guido and Hugh because, as
you’ll no doubt have noticed, the two interpretations contradict one another—for
Guido, the chalice is the place of inebriating divinization, while, for Hugh, it
is the place of earthly suffering. Yet the very incoherence of interpretation—rather
than pointing merely to the constructed falsity of all analysis—may instead point
to a semiotic superabundance, a pedagogical paradox meant to rend the faculties
of the mind into a state of astonished contemplation. To take one explanation without
the other would impoverish the communicants’ interpretative intelligence,
leaving them poorly prepared to receive in the sacrament the Christ whose very nature
plays on precisely these fault-lines of interpretive paradox.
Which brings us to the second aspect of the mass: for here
is not only an object for interpretation but, in the consecrated host, a subject
who instructs.
In Hugh, the appearance of bread and wine is central to the
eucharist’s pedagogical program: by showing us earthly food, we are taught that
our spiritual hunger is satisfied by Christ. He writes, “the appearance of
bread and wine is proposed, that the full and perfect refection may be taught
to be in the taking of the body and blood of Christ, by reason of the divinity
of Christ.”[6]
Importantly, Christ’s appearing in visible food is a function of God’s loving condescension;
as Hugh argues elsewhere, since we have lost the ability to “know the
invisible,” we “could by no means have recognized divine things unless
stimulated by the human.”[7]
This is to say the sacrament beckons us through its visibility towards
interpretative acts that ultimately result, through a play of paradox, in
invisible knowledge. Even our physical eating of the sacrament is an act of
interpretation: we treat God as food and thereby recognize God’s nourishing love.
To speak in paradoxical terms, we are taught through visible means to see that
which cannot be seen.
Guido, borrowing from St. Ambrose, likewise conceives of the
sacrament as a subject offering instruction to our perceptions; he writes that the
sacrament forms us “in the catholic faith” by washing “the spiritual eyes of
the soul” with the “blood of Christ” so that those “things that belong to the
faith” become available through physical means.[8]
This seems to indicate that one’s participation in the sacrament ultimately
clarifies one’s perception of the sacrament, so that a dialogic pattern is
established in which we are able to ascend to the Word through our perceptive
and interpretive words, words that falter and dissolve in paradox at every
point so that we are sustained only by the silent eating of that “viaticum,” that “journey provision” which
“strengthens the recipient lest he grow faint on the path of this world.”[9]
Again, we can point to a consonance between these medieval
writers and modern scholars of religion, especially Geertz, who notes that we don’t
simply interpret symbols: they, in turn, are capable of “establish[ing]
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by…formulating
conceptions of a general order of existence…”[10]
Here is an echo of Guido’s assertion that, through the sacrament, “we are
formed…”[11]
By placing Geertz in dialogue with Hugh and Guido, I don’t
intend to fabricate a simple historical continuity in the interpretation of religious
symbols. But the fact that their approaches to interpretation of “mystic signification”
seem to have at least points of consonance calls for further investigation and
research. Why does medieval
interpretation of the mass map so easily onto Geertz’s symbolic anthropology?
And what are the places of difference—when do their interpretive projects cease
to align? Perhaps most importantly: how have the eucharistic debates of the
last millennium effected the way the academic study of religion encounters religious
cultures that didn’t play a part in those debates?
As Talal Asad points out, “Geertz’s treatment of religious
belief…is a modern, privatized Christian one…”[12]
This is to say that his academic approach to religion results from “a
particular history of knowledge and power…”[13] Ultimately, the mass isn't just there for our interpretation; it has already formed many of us as we undertake interpretive endeavors outside of Christianity. For this reason, the historical study of sacramental interpretation proves
itself helpful not only for those whose personal beliefs arise from the
Christian tradition but also for those who want to engage both with other religious traditions and with recent theorists of the academic study of religion.
-Dawn Treader
[1] Philip
Gröning, Into Great Silence, DVD (Zeitgeist Films, 2007).
[2] See
Martin Mosebach, The Heresy of Formlessness: The Roman Liturgy and Its Enemy,
trans. Harrison Graham (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006).
[3] Qtd.
Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in
Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993),
30.
[4] Guido
of Monte Rochen, Handbook for Curates: A Late Medieval Manual on Pastoral
Ministry, trans. Anne T. Thayer, Medieval Texts in Translation (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 99.
[5] Hugh
of St. Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, ed. Joseph
Saint-George, trans. Roy Deferrari (Ex Fontibus Company, n.d.), 311–12.
[6] Hugh of St.
Victor, 310.
[7] Hugh of St.
Victor, 157.
[8] Guido
of Monte Rochen, Handbook for Curates, 60–61.
[9] Guido of Monte
Rochen, 51.
[10] Qtd.
Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 29.
[11] Guido
of Monte Rochen, Handbook for Curates, 60.
[12] Asad, Genealogies
of Religion, 47.
[13] Asad, 54.
A very smart post, Dawn! I've read Geertz before and found him interesting, but I think you illuminate both the usefulness and the limits of the usefulness for medieval Christianity well.
ReplyDeleteI like this quote particularly: "rituals aren’t just there for us to unlock their significance through a decoding interpretation: the ritual changes the very subjectivity that would like to forward those interpretations." As a literary scholar, the role of interpretation is very important to me, but I think that you're right, that things have meaning independent of interpretations as well. So, in religion and other cultural practices, I think we have to consider the "totality of the circumstances" if you will, where we consider both our interpretation of the art/ritual/text as having some type of legitimacy, because we are humans interacting with this thing, and also the meanings possibly inherent in that art/ritual/text. Maybe we can glean the later by looking at other people's perspectives on the same thing. The overlap between a lot of scholars may yield some type of universal meaning. Or not. I don't know. Thanks for the provoking ideas!
I agree with LAJ: very nice demonstration how Geertz's understanding of symbol depends upon a Christian understanding of sacrament. You demonstrate beautifully, although you don't put it in quite these terms, the difference between history and allegory that Tolkien pointed to: history works back on us, while allegory is something to be decoded. Sacrament works not as allegory but as history: as both figure and event, in Auerbach's terms. This is why it has (as you nicely put it) such "semiotic superabundance," as opposed to rituals (if there are any) that are consciously designed to signify. This is also why they act back on us—just as the Carthusian argued! RLFB
ReplyDelete